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 “If I am I because you are you, and if you are you because I am I,  
then I am not I and you are not you”  





Ideas about identity have a comparatively long and diverse history that contemporary management and 
organization studies (MOS) ignore at their peril, and a principal aim of this article is to examine some 
of the implications of doing so. One implication is the tendency for a perpetual reinvention of the 
wheel, and invariably one that is expected to run on the firm foundations of a clear and smooth road 
ahead. In matters of identity, however, paths are strewn with debris, roads full of potholes, numerous 
back streets turn into blind alleys and often there is not even a road on which to travel or a destination 
that is anything more than ephemeral. Staying with the same metaphor, the literature on identity in 
MOS often seems blinded by the oncoming headlights, thus losing the capacity to look back at what 
has gone before or sideways to alternative literatures.  
It may be argued that the paradox of identity is that it involves us simultaneously being 
‘different from everyone else’ and yet ‘the same as others’ with whom we identify (Pullen, 2007, p. 1). 
It is then a desire to be unique, distinctive and different at one and the same time as a concern to 
identify with a particular doctrine, set of ideas, faction, gender, race, organization, culture, nation, etc. 
Matters of a discrete and singular identity would appear to safeguard against domination, but notions of 
the autonomous self have been described as illusory (Watts, 1951; Haraway, 1991; Braidotti, 2013). 
Such ideas derive from enlightenment and humanistic philosophies that in recent time have been 
deployed and elaborated by neo-liberal governmental strategies, transforming individuals into self-
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disciplined, autonomous subjects through prevailing exercises of power (Foucault, 1982; McCabe, 
2009; Mangan, 2009). To a large extent, this self-discipline is part of what it means for subjects to 
secure meaning and identity through engaging in the practices that power invokes (Knights, 2002), 
however self-defeating.  Self-defeating in the sense of presuming that meaning and identity can be 
stabilised, when by virtue of its construction, identity is inherently precarious and ephemeral because of 
its dependence on the unpredictable and uncontrollable social confirmation of others.  Nonetheless, the 
enlightenment idea of an autonomous self tends to fuel the myth that identity can be secured, for 
example, through climbing the hierarchies of fame and fortune represented by the inequalities of 
material and symbolic wealth. In falling for this illusion of a fully autonomous self, we readily take 
identity for granted as a real and achievable goal for stabilizing meaning and reality, obscuring how it 
is partly an effect of exercises of power that constitute us, as this or that kind of subject (Foucault, 
1982).  Of course, power/knowledge effects on subjectivity do not remove the agency of subjects to 
mediate, interpret, negotiate and resist the meanings and relations surrounding their (our) subjection. 
Indeed, the very ethics and aesthetics of subjectivity arise from our (their) refusal to be what we (they) 
have become historically through so many exercises of power (Foucault, 2011).  However, this 
involves risks since the presumed potential stability of identity is threatened by challenging its 
constitution through power. Consequently, in everyday life we often avoid such uncomfortable 
questions, and yet while it might be expected otherwise, so do many contemporary theorists of identity.   
One argument of this article is that this occurs partly because of a contemporary amnesia and 
myopia where there can be a lack of concern to look either backwards or sideways, such that the 
peripheral vision potentially afforded by the past and other disciplines is lost, or rendered invisible in 
management and organization studies of identity. It partly results from a pessimism about the future 
that involves ‘a narcissistic inability to identify with posterity’ … or to be part of … ‘a historical 
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stream’ (Lasch, 1979, p. 102). A further consequence of this condition is a limitation of vision that 
might enable studies to fulfil their future ‘analytical promise’ (Brown, 2015, p.20), so our title ‘Pushing 
the boundaries of amnesia and myopia’ is intended to be provocative in alerting us to the possibility 
that past, and a more diverse range of present literatures may enable us to develop analyses that go 
beyond common sense understandings. For by treating it as little more than a resource for security, we 
forget that identity is routinely dependent on unpredictable and often impetuous ‘others’ for 
confirmation of its claim to validity.  
In this article, we attempt to reinvigorate what we see as an interrogation of identity that is 
limited by these tendencies towards amnesia and myopia. Our critical reflections then explore 
alternative relationships with others that might transcend everyday preoccupations with, and attachment 
to, identity. These have the potential to challenge and interrogate our tendencies to take identity for 
granted, to disrupt assumptions that it offers stability and security and instead to simply acknowledge 
that our embodied and ethical relationships with one another need not be just about us. To clarify, we 
are not questioning the prevalent centrality of identity as an everyday concern, but rather the sense in 
which researchers fail to question or investigate individuals’ subjective attachments to it and how this 
reproduces the narcissism of contemporary life whether at work or in society more generally.    
The remainder of this paper begins with a summary of our methodology, which departs from 
those approaches that caught within the legacy of positivism attempt to legitimize their research 
through quasi-representative claims.  We instead do not apologize for our critical hermeneutic and 
interpretative approach and therefore eschew the very idea of representationalism. We then turn to what 
we consider to be important historical contributions to analyses of identity, and a discussion of 
literature that is not just located either within MOS or focused exclusively on the concept of ‘identity, 
when associated terms such as self and subjectivity are equally preoccupied with its concerns. We then 
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compare this with some contemporary MOS literature to show how the myopia and amnesia of 
neglecting sources of a broader nature has resulted in academic analyses reflecting and reproducing 
everyday preoccupations with, rather than challenges to, identity. By challenging these preoccupations, 
we can generate more embodied and engaged understandings of social relations that displace the 
narcissism associated with identity. For reasons of space we limit our analysis of identity in MOS 
primarily to issues of a historical, disciplinary, gender and bodily nature. Finally, we summarise the 
arguments before examining the implications of the analysis and its potential contribution for future 
studies.   
 
Methodology 
In considering our approach to writing this article, we were acutely aware that ‘making coherent sense 
of this increasingly vast, heterogeneous and fragmented literature is a daunting task’ (Brown, 2015, 
p.23).  We began by emulating the process that Brown (2015, p.21) had adopted of identifying relevant 
articles by searching Thompson Reuters Web of Knowledge.  However, our searches threw up different 
literatures and it became clear that ultimately the choice depended quite substantially, if not arbitrarily, 
on the researcher’s own interpretations, for even if we subscribed to traditional notions of ‘validity’ and 
‘reliability’ these are predicated on ‘replicability’, which clearly failed to materialize in this case.  
Consequently, we are sympathetic to the view that to ‘produce the definitive’ identity literature review 
is an ‘impossible task’ (duGay and Evans, 2000, p.2), as well as a misplaced aspiration, due to the 
extensiveness and disparity of the literature.  Instead, we decided to follow a more interventionist 
approach of selecting the literatures to examine in relation to particular themes, through which our 
contribution was being organized. Since knowledge is situated, contextual and indexical, multiple 
interpretations of texts are always possible, and so ours is no more than one interpretation of the 
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identity literature in MOS, rather than any objective attempt to position ourselves as arbitrators of what 
constitutes ‘good’ or ‘bad’.  However, we argue that this is one way of challenging the assumption that 
because identity is so all-pervasive, it is not in need of questioning or interrogating. 
To elaborate, this review reflects a methodological stance that is more consistent with our 
deconstructivist and anti-positivist epistemology and its ‘ontological questions’ and implications 
(Wolfe, 2012, p.31). We feel strongly that the requirements to present accounts of research in a 
particular way constrain studies that do not fit, or are even deliberately opposed to, positivist 
paradigms. As such, social science also suffers from a degree of methodological tunnel vision because 
frequently data, whether directly empirical or materials derived from the literature, are presented in a 
detached and formalistic manner, as if they are independent of the researcher’s embodied experience or 
underlying concerns (Knights, 2015). This is even more absurd in researcher accounts that go on to 
challenge the belief that ‘objects’ can be accurately represented. To conceal one’s concerns or 
embodied experiences behind this myth of ‘independence’ and ‘objectivity’ is, in our view, 
disingenuous and rather less rigorous than allowing the reader to see what is really driving the selection 
and analysis of the data. As researchers, we are not, and never can be, separate from the ‘objects’ 
researched, and therefore any attempt to disentangle how our mutually constituted practices are enacted 
is impossible (Mol, 2002).  
As we subscribe to this critique of a positivism that remains prevalent in establishment social 
science (e.g. Yin, 2008), we commend, rather than apologize for, our constructivist and interpretive 
approach. Having said this, we do not subscribe to a relativist methodology where ‘anything goes’ but 
rather our selection of literature is designed not only to support, but also to challenge the arguments we 
make about amnesia and myopia. Of course, we eschew any attempt or claim to be exhaustive for this 
is just another feature of the representational paradigm and especially its heavily masculine 
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exemplifications (Clough, 1992). However, we do intersperse our analysis with contemporary 
examples of past and present literature partly to endorse the breach of arbitrary historical boundaries 
that are indispensable to writing a history of the present (Foucault, 1979). In addition, our approach 
accepts Spinoza’s invitation to all ‘in the social, to really be there’ (Negri, 2013, p. 95, our emphasis), 
where this implies a fully embodied and engaged presence, not a detached and narrow, cognitively 
controlled observation from a ‘safe distance’. This has the methodological implication that we be 
passionately and bodily engaged with our research subject(s) whether texts or other bodies. We have 
articulated our methodological deliberationsi in the expectation that they may help legitimise similar 
attempts by other scholars to avoid the sedimented views of what is considered ‘rigorous’ and ‘robust’, 
especially when they contradict the author’s more general epistemology and ontology, a problem that 
‘all writers who wish to contribute to this field must either struggle with or against’ (Bell and Bryman, 
2011, p.706). 
We agree that ‘the fields of identity theory and organizational theory are huge’ (Sveningsson 
and Alvesson, 2003, p.1166). Instead we chose to follow the ‘less daunting’ and more feasible strategy 
adopted by du Gay and Evans (2000), which was to ‘track specific themes, debates or positions…rather 
than attempt to map the field’ (p.2). As such, our choice of literature is focused around problematizing 
studies of identity in the organizational and management field, insofar as they often present identity in 
a disembodied, ahistorical, and taken-for-granted way that tends to reflect, rather than challenge, 
notions of instrumental individualism. However, we have also been careful to refer to some of the 
exceptions to these amnesic and myopic tendencies in the literature. 
This led us to present our literature review in terms of three tendencies; firstly, by failing to 
trace the genealogy of the concept of identity and self /subjectivity back to earlier theorists, some 
contemporary literature displays a form of retrogradeii amnesia that often results in a perpetual 
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reinvention of the wheel. Secondly, this amnesia regarding its historicity has been combined with a 
tendency to be myopic with regard to problems of taking identity for granted, as a given, rather than 
interrogating its conditions and consequences, and this we have characterised as being blinded by the 
headlights. Thirdly, we explore and challenge how identity has come to be constituted as a 
disembodied phenomenon, largely through the dominant discursive, linguistic and often masculine 
narratives surrounding it. Were we to be driven by the body a little more, we might be less likely to 
suffer from amnesia and myopia or to reinvent the wheel and be blinded by the headlights. We need 
also to remember that “driving” is an embodied practice and when seeking to reach a defined 
destination we may not just be blinded by the oncoming headlights, but also often by unrealistic 
masculine expectations and demands upon our bodies.  We liken this to research that is blind to how 
attempts to secure the self through identity might become the symbolic equivalent of a disastrous road 
accident caused by tiredness. What we want to encourage by our analysis, then, is a more fully 
embodied and ethically engaged understanding of social relations that would counter the individualistic 
preoccupation with, and attachment to, identity as a futile and often self-defeating means of rendering 
the self stable and secure.  For it has been argued that such ‘avoidance of impermanence’ and ‘the 
tendency to conform, to normalize, to secure and control’ is the pathway to, if not already the terminal 
of, a destructive technocratic ‘nihilism’ (Levin, 1985:74). Levin reaches this conclusion through his 
analysis of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty who sought to resist this nihilism that, transfixed 
by cognitively, masculine disembodied rationality, goes comparatively unchallenged in modern 
society. 
Of course, as one of our reviewers reminded us, not all scholars fail to consult ideas and 
literature from the past or from other disciplines (e.g. Knights and Willmott, 1985; 1989; 1999/2004; 
Casey, 1995; Kondo, 1990; Collinson, 2003; Roberts, 2005; Beech, 2008; Simpson and Carroll, 2008; 
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Reedy, 2009; Lok and Willmott, 2014; Knights and Clarke, 2014), and these may thereby transcend 
‘artificial categories’ between the old that is forgotten, or neglected, and the wider or not-yet-realized 
understandings that are currently beyond our vision. If we view such scholars as embodying our 
metaphor by continually working to improve their craft, rather than just reinventing the same wheel, we 
assume they are immersed in the tradition and culture of ideas, engaging in significant enactments of 
practice, and contribution to the field, and as such are less likely to be blinded by the headlights. That 
is, we presume they do not start from scratch each time, suffer from amnesia by forgetting what has 
gone before, or neglect to look sideways, but rather they refine their previous ideas and historical 
foundations while also continuing to experiment and develop new ideas.  
 
Re-inventing the Wheel? 
Our concern is that historical, multidisciplinary and different terminologies in the analysis of identity 
have sometimes been neglected in recent studies, resulting not only in a glossing over of important 
insights, but also a continual reinvention of the wheel, albeit not one well designed for the road ahead. 
The amnesia might be partly grounded in the false belief that 'history begins with the primitive and 
backward, the weak and the helpless’ (Heidegger, 1961, p. 130). In contrast we seek to illustrate how 
there is a wealth of literature about the self from the past that, if consulted, would oil the wheels of 
research so as to render it more sensitive to the slippery surface of its journey, and help challenge the 
laudatory veil that surrounds identity.  In the everyday world, identity would seem as sacrosanct as 
human life itself but we might expect academics to at least subject this notion to critical interrogation, 
yet too often this is not the case, and neither are earlier literatures always mined sufficiently. For 
example, in this same journal a review of identity in organizations (Brown, 2015), while possibly one 
of the least amnesic and myopic contributions, ignores authors such as Becker (1969; 1973) and Watts 
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(1951; 1973) who seriously problematize identity as a resource for security. This is one illustration of 
how the myopia of remaining locked into a single sub-discipline such as MOS is risky, for it can 
prevent analysis from building on previous insights, for example, some earlier theorists regard identity 
pursuits primarily as self-defeating attempts to escape insecurity (Watts, 1973), or an effort to make life 
meaningful (Becker, 1969).  Moreover, these omissions can also obfuscate in many ways: for example, 
the inevitability of death and decay; the facilitation of tendencies to reproduce the anthropocentric 
deceit (and conceit) that we control our lives, ‘act’ as ‘willful and free individual[s]’, or have a ‘unique 
and self-fashioned identity’ that enables us all to be ‘somebody’ (Becker, 1973, p.55).  These 
oversights, we argue, can ‘inhibit learning’ (Klein, 1997, p.9) and are also symptomatic of amnesia, a 
way of defoliating or even effacing memory. 
This does not mean that we subscribe to a view of history as some absolute truth, for ‘the past 
… is always understood in the context of the concerns of the present’ (Miller, 1993, p.32; Case et al. 
2011, p. 246), so that we are for ever engaged in a ‘history of the present’ (Foucault, 1979), seeking to 
explore the historical conditions of what made it possible for us to be represented in this particular way. 
Consequently, history cannot be ‘read off’ independently of current concerns, as Wittgenstein (1958) 
made clear in speaking about indexicality, for the meaning of any concept is tied to the context of its 
use, and thus to our present anxieties and preoccupations. By the same token, we do not advocate 
unadulterated eclecticism since that leads only to relativism that is bereft of a position or point of view 
(Bernstein, 1998). 
Drawing on a narrow semantic interpretation, Moran (2015) argues that in its present form, 
identity did not actually ‘exist’ until the 1960s. We accept that prior to this period there was not the 
same intensity and level of attention given to the preoccupation with identity concerning one’s own 
self-image, and this actual term, as opposed to what it implied, had not yet entered everyday 
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consciousness. However, philosophically the meaning lying behind the concept of identity can be 
traced back at least as far as Hegel (1807/1977) who developed a theory of the dialectics of recognition 
as the fundamental grounds of the formation of self, and it is difficult not to agree with Hegel that 
without social recognition a ‘person’s sense of identity can be utterly destroyed’ (Singer, 2001, p. 78).   
Even though we need not dwell too much on Hegel, it is impossible to deny the genesis of ideas 
about identity in Mead’s (1934) articulation of how the active subject (‘I’), the target (‘me’) and the 
social frame (‘generalized other’) of its action combine to form a self or identity through regular and 
routine, co-constituted social interactions. Identity, then, is the unending and recursive perceptions of 
others’ perceptions of the self, and the identities of others are constituted through exactly the same 
processes but Mead’s (ibid: 56) concern with consequences leads him to see the meaning of symbols as 
fixed and universal across interactions and so he does not explore ‘ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, 
or even lying in communication’ (Psathas, 2014, p. 28) even though these are implicit in his analysis of 
the self, and one important way in which identity is rendered precarious. So, every presentation we 
make is some kind of claim to, although never a guarantee of, a particular identity (Goffman, 1959; 
1967), but these are ordinarily proxies for a wider symbolic order in that they reflect and reproduce as 
well as challenge and re-construct the broader social and cultural norms. In this sense, identity is 
subject to confirmation, indifference or denial in everyday interpersonal interactions that are social 
rather than psychological in both their genesis and their outcomes. For identities only exist when they 
are interactingiii such that the relationship between conceptions of a seemingly discrete ‘self’ and wider 
‘society’ is rather an unrelenting, inter and intra-dependent, co-constituting phenomenon (Barad, 2007).  
In working with Mead’s ideas and the succeeding symbolic-interactionist perspective (Blumer, 
1969; Manis and Meltzer, 1967; Meltzer, et al., 1975), we are less likely to take identity for granted 
since its ephemeral quality strikes us at every turn, which has its parallel in physics where it is argued 
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‘that the world is a continuous, restless swarming of things; a continuous coming to light and 
disappearance of ephemeral entities’ (Rovelli, 2014: 31). However, like many theoretical perspectives 
symbolic interactionism has limitations.  Firstly, it has little to say about the historic conditions that 
serve as both a medium and an outcome of any interpretive process, rendering it open to accusations of 
being contextually and politically naive.  Secondly, it tends to treat individuals as strangely 
disembodied constructing them in Cartesian terms as cognitively privileged, whereby bodily desires 
and feelings are readily colonized by the mind.  In addition, Mead’s ‘Generalized Other’ is 
conceptualised as oddly unitarist, thereby indicating that individuals strive for some kind of coherence 
and stability in relation to an apparently singular ideal, which cannot be other than a fantasy (see 
Brown, this issue).   
Although it has been argued that symbolic interactionism exaggerates the autonomy of the subject 
in ways that can be self-defeating (Knights and Willmott, 1999/2004), this is not a necessary 
consequence of the theory (see Brown, this issue). For example, many have taken on board the fragility 
of identity due to its recursively constructed nature but have avoided any attachment to individual 
autonomy that is its mirror image.  Instead, authors such as Becker (1969; 1973) and Watts (1951; 
1966; 1973) speak about the self-contradictory nature of attachments to identity since the self is always 
fragile and vulnerable to implosion, especially when others fail to provide the necessary social 
confirmations to hold it in place.  This lack of validation can happen in a moment, and at any moment. 
Becker (1973) believed these preoccupations were a ‘vital lie…a necessary and basic dishonesty about 
oneself and one’s whole situation’ (p.55), a means of allaying imminent death that is ultimately self-
defeating, since the body of every human being is vulnerable to mortality. However, the symbolic 
constitution of the self is threatened even more explicitly and frequently through its dependence on the 
fickle, and unpredictable other(s), for the social confirmations that it craves,  
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If I want to be secure, that is, protected from the flux of life, I am wanting to be separate from 
life. Yet it is this very sense of separateness, which makes me feel insecure (Watts, 1951, 
p.77)  
So it is precisely this self-defeating craving and associated preoccupation with the self that we believe 
is a product of enlightenment discourse and subject-object binary thinking, whereby the body and 
affect are subordinated to the mind and cognition (Knights, 2015). While this binary served as the 
conditions of possibility for the social scientific study of human existence (Foucault, 1973), it also 
made possible and legitimized the preoccupation that modern humans have with their identity (Becker, 
1969). But this preoccupation reflects and reinforces an anxiety and insecurity that accompanies a 
misrecognition and solidification of self as stable and separate from the world, which is challenged not 
only in psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1980) but also in the physical sciences and humanities (Barad, 2007; 
Grosz, 1994; Braidotti, 2011). 
As we have implied, there are both positive and negative aspects to the sense of subject-object 
separation, positive in the sense that it stimulates us to be active and creative in the belief that, even if 
anxiety cannot be eradicated, active commitments will at least divert our attention from the morbidity 
of thinking about our separation as ultimately one of finitude (Sartre, 2004), but negative as those very 
projects designed to alleviate the anxiety of separation frequently exacerbate and thereby reproduce it. 
This is because social confirmations of the self are transient and precarious, so in need of constant re-
affirmation and renewal, and never guaranteed.  
Other 20th Century theorists have critically examined ideas of the autonomous self (Skinner, 
1971), arguing that ‘free will’ is illusory since human behaviour is simply a predictable response to 
stimuli, where any unexpected deviations can be attributed to as-yet unidentified stimuli. For Skinner, 
notions of autonomy are misplaced forms of flattery, and fantastical notions of choice and discretion, 
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merely derived from our attempts to ‘control, subdue or manage the forces of nature in society’ as well 
as ‘a comforting belief in our own wilful capacity to determine our own fate’ (Knights and Willmott, 
2004, p.64). In this case, identity cannot be taken for granted, for it has little place in theorising human 
action because in removing the ‘black box’ of thought from individuals, behaviourists eradicate any 
sense of human agency. While concurring to some extent with the behaviourist critique of autonomy, 
we cannot agree that human beings are devoid of agentic power, for they mediate their worlds through 
processes of constructing, challenging, and reconfiguring meaning. For us, embodied agency is ‘a 
defining characteristic of what it is to be human…a non-negotiable aspect of identity’ (Knights and 
Willmott, 2004, p.68).  
In different ways, the psychoanalytic approach also challenges autonomy, for it is predicated on 
ideas of unconscious forces and desires that often leave the subject unaware, and thereby incapable of 
controlling their emotions, fantasies and actions. Freud (1923/2014) claimed that our ways of enacting 
are always a consequence of events occurring in our early lives relating to the id (primitive desires), the 
ego (balancing the demands of the id with social realism) and the superego (the conscience).  As Lacan 
(2008) argues, the image of the self as an independent, solid, discrete and autonomous being is 
misplaced, through a process of meconnaissance, or misrecognition. This arises from our first 
encounter with a mirror image of the self that the ego mistakes for a discrete individual entity and the 
‘illusion of autonomy to which it entrusts itself’ (Lacan, 1980, p.6), and which also ‘leads us to deny or 
forget the irretrievably social construction of the self’ (Roberts, 2005, p.637).  Psychoanalysis purports 
to challenge ideas of a discrete self, for this leads to an over-attachment to fantasies about individual 
achievement and notions of perfect selves always beyond reach (Schwartz, 1987).  
Later critiques, however, show how psychoanalysis can itself serve to repress subjects through 
reproducing processes of normalisation, by standardising a set of behaviours, from which any deviance 
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becomes pathological and subjectd to surveillance (Foucault, 1979). Despite this, and Lacan’s (1980) 
critique of autonomy, psychoanalysis obligates individuals to ‘work’ on themselves to ‘correct’ 
‘abnormalities’ and reconcile repressed anxieties (Freud, 1923/2014; Jung, 1968). This not only 
legitimizes and reproduces fantasies of an orderly and normalized world, but also narcissistic 
inclinations that thrive on, rather than undermine, contemporary preoccupations with the self.  
Finally, we cannot ignore the literature on existentialism that theorises the self as autonomous and 
discrete yet caught up in a precarious world of meaningless uncertainty and unpredictability, not least 
because of the finitude of existence.  The primary concern then must be to commit ourselves to 
meaningful projects that shield us from the anxiety of a vacuous existential void, rather than live 
‘small’ and insignificant lives preoccupied with mundane concerns and trivial matters that the majority 
of people are afforded by bourgeois existence. In Sartre’s branch of existentialism, we are ‘condemned 
to be free’ (Sartre, 1957) but this enables us to bypass a life characterised by meaningless ‘endeavours’, 
and instead become dedicated to projects through which we can locate our ‘true’ and ‘authentic’ self so 
as to realize our potential. Since we live only briefly in an oppressively uncertain world, potentially 
without any meaning, we must confront our mortality to live deliberately,  
Life is occupied in both perpetuating itself and in surpassing itself; if all it does is maintain 
itself, then living is only not dying (de Beauvoir, 1948 p.83, our emphasis) 
In order to alleviate potential existentialist insecurities, or slipping into nihilism, one must instead adopt 
radical individual ideas in order to render the world meaningful, and come to realise what we are 
‘capable of doing and overcoming’ (Kierkegaard, 1967, p.40).  Unfortunately, this sometimes results in 
our becoming blind to the oppressive and dehumanized nature of some political causes and Sartre’s 
unwavering support for Soviet communism regardless of atrocities led to break-ups with close friends 
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such as Camus (Aronson, 2004) and Merleau-Ponty (O’Neil, 1998). Equally problematically, we often 
adopt humanist ideals of working on the self, possibly to extremes, in order to realise our seemingly 
‘limitless potential’ (Glynos 2008; Costea, et al. 2012). In this sense, 
The role of agency is not only significant but is laid upon us as an ethical imperative, as the 
only way of having a fully human existence” (Reedy, 2009, p.114) 
In terms of our motoring analogy existentialists encourage us to be alert, and exercise our freedom, to 
‘choose’ new territories to drive ourselves toward; destinations unknown.  The exhortation to do so is 
deemed necessary in order to find meaning, as an attempt to avert nihilism - those empty potholes we 
encounter on the contingent highway of life, for the only certainty is that one day we will literally, and 
metaphorically, come to a ‘dead end’.  However, notions that we are completely autonomous, that man 
(sic) can ‘constantly invent his own path’ (Sartre) to find meaning and security and become ‘fully 
human’ is ultimately self-defeating, as we, and other critics (e.g. Watts, 1951) have shown.   
We have sought to suggest that because much contemporary literature on identity in MOS 
neglects many of these important authors from the past and within associated disciplines, they end up 
reinventing the wheel if only to travel on a track that seems to go around in circles without the vision 
left by their antecedents. One such vision deriving from Merleau-Ponty was to acknowledge that 
through interrogation we see much that has already been forgotten in ways that harmonize both seeing 
and knowing ‘in the limitless movement of desire’ (Lefort, 1974, 706). Without such vision, in the next 
section we argue that some contemporary theorists repeat and reproduce the same ‘ethical’ imperative 
to ‘be someone’, perhaps in the belief they are heading for a ‘different’ place, along the road less 
travelled.  Partly this may be because the road names have changed, and the new vehicle ‘identity’ is 
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spray painted in a seemingly ‘neutral’ neo-liberal hue, and fuelled by meritocratic ideologies of 
successful selves.  
 
Blinded by the Headlights 
With a research focus on management and organization, it might seem unnecessary to discuss earlier 
and broader literatures, but we argue that this neglect accepts, rather than challenges, commonsense 
beliefs about identity. Of course, these beliefs are themselves perpetrated through contemporary 
cultural and social institutions, whether it is the family and education, politics and the media, or 
management, work and organization. Identity, it has even been argued, may be an empty or floating 
signifier (Levi-Strauss, 1987, p.63; Laclau, 1996) for ‘it is precisely the non-transparency of 
identity…that forces us to continuously invent it’ (Giesen and Seyfert, 2016, p.114). Is this partly what 
leads us to construct identity as a panacea of supreme worth and a realisable goal, rather than a 
transient experience that secures only temporary respite from everyday anxieties and insecurities? By 
accepting rather than challenging this common-sense view of identity, some contemporary literature 
(e.g. Ybema et al., 2009; Gill, 2015) may inadvertently give it further legitimacy, so even what purports 
to be critical analysis can ‘somehow come to take the very project of identity for granted’ (Roberts, 
2005, p.638). Also, attributions of intentionality and rationality are often conferred on identity, like a 
commodity to be acquired through planning and purposive action so as to assist ‘those in organizations 
to accomplish specific objectives or goals’ (Ainsworth and Grant, 2012, p.61).  
Some authors conflate their own ideas with commonsense understandings of everyday life, such 
that in failing to interrogate identity we cannot always determine whether they are merely describing 
what lay persons are doing or projecting their own beliefs onto subjects. For example, in the statement 
‘professionals may best be regarded as reflexive appropriators of organizational discourse in pursuit of 
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valued work objectives and preferred identities’, Brown and Lewis (2011, p.886) assume a good deal of 
intentionality, self-consciousness and autonomy around subjects’ desires, as well as a degree of 
amnesia or myopia about the contingent nature of identity.  This occurs possibly because of an 
unconscious recourse to epistemological and ontological binaries, whereby subjects are seen (or see 
themselves) as separate autonomous entities, able to construct ‘particular’ identities by their own 
volition.  The consequence of this is not benign, since rather than viewing identity as a web of complex 
entanglements the boundaries of which are fragile and fluid (Barad, 2007; see Atewologun et al., and 
Haslam et al., this issue), it is seen merely as a resource or ‘coping’ strategy ‘to avoid cognitive and 
emotive dissonance’ (Knights and Willmott, 1985, p.26). This binary thinking is reinforced by 
contemporary observations of the tendency to treat identity ‘as a descriptive category rather than as an 
analytical tool’ (Brown, 2015, p. 33). Identity studies are then in danger of becoming ‘overly myopic, 
introspective and detached from broader debates’ (Coupland and Brown, 2012, p.2), although we 
would also warn against the amnesia of neglecting earlier literatures that might serve as reminders.  
An example of this appears in the well-regarded paper Identity Matters (Alvesson et al., 2008) 
where the oldest citation relating to identity is Ashforth and Mael (1989), but might we expect an 
editorial introduction for a Special Issue on this topic to give some attention to its genealogy? Although 
debating the distinction between identity as ‘a fresh take on a range of phenomena…that illuminates 
novel angles’ (Alvesson et al., 2008, p.6), or suggesting the possibility that it is only adopted because it 
‘is currently in vogue’ (p.7) they also attempt to make sense of the disparate literature and its 
‘strikingly different philosophical frameworks’ (ibid. p.8).  However, the theoretical analysis appears to 
leapfrog historical or interdisciplinary contributions to identity. Consequently, by perhaps trying to 
establish an ‘ostensibly new “master signifier” among organizational scholars’ (ibid., p.6), they appear 
to display elements of amnesia and myopia in disregarding the insights of earlier literatures concerning 
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the self-defeating and contingent aspects of identity as a source of stability and security.  That said, 
careful interrogation of this work also highlights ambiguities and ambivalence, so we wholly appreciate 
how the authors acknowledge the historical and culturally contrived nature of identity,  
‘there is nothing natural or self-evident about concern with who we are; preoccupation is a 
cultural, historical formation’ … of which … ‘the surge of identity scholarship is part’ (2008, 
p.11). 
Here Alvesson et al. make an insightful link concerning contemporary capitalism and the preoccupation 
with identity, explaining how the latter has become increasingly more prevalent in contemporary life, 
as well as in academic research.  However, a key opportunity is missed, which is to prompt future 
scholars of identity to problematise, challenge, and treat with ambivalence, ideas of excessive 
individualism that may come to resemble ‘productive narcissism’ (Pullen and Rhodes, 2008). In short, 
further interrogation and theorizing concerning the self-defeating aspects of identity work might serve 
here as a reminder, or warning, that attempts to assert our ‘right to self-fulfillment’ (Lasch, 1979, p. 
102) risk leading us to an ever-increasing vicious spiral of concern with ourselves (Costea et al., 2012). 
While the paper by Alvesson et. al., (2008) is a good exemplar of how some organization 
studies papers may not fully interrogate identity (Hogg and Terry, 2001; Pritchard and Symon, 2011), 
we can explicate our arguments a little more clearly by drawing on Croft et al’s (2015) study of nurses. 
The study takes a traditional view of identity, constructing nurses as having ‘multiple’ identities that 
result in ‘an emotional attachment to their professional group identity’, which then leads to a conflict 
with their ‘managerial leader identity’ (p.113). Such a ‘framing’ provides opportunities for researchers 
to challenge the way that participants account for their attachment to identity, rather than reproducing it 
in their analysis. In short, the authors could, but do not, problematise how people tend to talk in ways 
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that reifies notions of particular ‘types’ of identity, and slice them up, such that their ‘managerial leader 
identity’ conflicts with a preferred ‘professional group identity’. We argue that because of the dynamic 
and precarious character of identity formation, where it might be better to talk of enacting certain 
practices, Croft et al (2015) assume that identity can be ‘achieved’, resembling a coherent and 
‘finished’ product. 
We are not in any way suggesting that all MOS literature tends to treat identity in this way, 
taking it as a given, for there are numerous exceptions to this charge (Knights and Willmott, 
1999/2004; Casey, 1995; Collinson, 2003; Roberts, 2005; Czarniawska, 2008; Pullen and Rhodes, 
2008; Ekman, 2013), among others.  There are also many who do not necessarily challenge the 
preoccupation with identity, or critically examine its conditions and consequences, but do at least focus 
upon social and collective, rather than just individualistic, identity work (Mangan, 2009; McCabe, 
2007; 2009; Tomkins and Eatough, 2014). That said, in the literature as well as in practice, while 
identity is often associated with social wellbeing, this does not necessarily preclude it from being a 
resource for elevating the self over 'other', for all sorts of collective projects, even those reflecting 
charitable aims, can be a vehicle for rendering the self stable, secure and socially valued (O'Toole and 
Grey, 2016a, 2016b; Weller, 2016).  
Relatedly, attachments to particular (elite) institutions instead of to the work itself, could also be 
theorised, but often are not, and as an example Gill’s study of management consultants states 
‘‘although it may seem paradoxical, the enhanced status and confidence that can come from 
employment in an elite consulting firm may lead to increased anxiety’ (2015, p.319). Earlier theorists 
would find this less surprising or novel, for craving membership to such intuitions is the very thing that 
makes us insecure (Mead, 1934; Watts, 1951), not least because ‘enhanced status’ is transient, and 
dependent on the continual re-affirmations from others (Knights and Willmott, 1999/2004).  To extend 
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academic analysis beyond the contemporary ‘lay’ treatment of identity that has become hegemonic, 
individual desire for status and recognition could rather be used to demonstrate how the achievement of 
instrumental outcomes necessarily displace more embodied engagement, when people  
change focus from what they are doing to the fascination of being the one doing it … hide in 
the limitless concerns about identity (Ekman, 2013, p.18) 
Importantly, this preoccupation with self as both a condition and consequence of taking identity for 
granted, can also fuel a range of instrumental and individual practices that breach ethical or 
humanitarian norms (Schwartz, 1987; Sternberg, 2013).  This is partly because society ‘gives 
prominence and encouragement to narcissistic traits’ (Lasch, 1979, p.xvii) where ‘success becomes the 
social value par excellence’ (Pullen and Rhodes, 2008, p.9).  These narcissistic preoccupations 
preclude us from fully engaging with Others (Lasch, 1977; Sennett, 1977), closing down alternative 
considerations in favour of ‘individual self-fulfillment and achievement’ (Beck, 2002, p.22),  
The meaning and purpose of dancing is the dance. Like music, also, it is fulfilled in each 
moment of its course. You do not play a sonata in order to reach the final chord (Watts, 1951, 
p.116)  
Rather than an engagement with work for its own sake, the MOS literature sometimes uncritically 
reinforces individualistic success ethics, whereby identity/ identity work are viewed as a functional 
means of getting ahead of the game (Joecks et al., 2014). Moreover, associations with contemporary 
working life (career, monetary bonuses, elite positions, success) appear embedded in the pursuit of 
particular identities as a Holy Grail, rather than encouraging us to constitute, and embody ourselves in 
ways that do not leave us separated off from one another.  After all, only a limited elite can ever (hope 
to) experience this transient sense of elation concerning achievement and success (Knights and Clarke, 
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2014).  Meanwhile, failure is individualised as a responsibility to oneself (Bauman, 2008, p.107, 
Sennett and Cobb, 1977, Newton, 1995), obliging, even compelling us to ‘work’ on ourselves as 
individual projects (Grey, 1994).  
Instrumentalism has been at least partially problematized in the MOS literature insofar as there 
is a proliferation of articles dealing with the attempted exercise of power, and the control/regulation of 
identities (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002; Kosmala and Herrbach, 2006; Kuhn, 2009; Brown and Lewis, 
2011). However, most studies never question identity per se, partly because we have naturalized the 
idea that identity is and should be of central concern, enabling organizations to colonise selves 
(whether as workers or customers) through a variety of coercive or reward based ‘career’ or 
‘commodity’ incentives ‘lures’ or ‘traps’, providing ‘recognition of the self as continuously improving’ 
(Roberts, 2005, p.629).  But these traps demand that we retain a ‘strong interest in control not just of 
the self but of others…to win their recognition through our own or their subordination, or more 
typically both’ (ibid, p. 637). One understanding of this situation is that individuals try to mitigate these 
anxieties through highly revered positions (Jensen, 2006; Gill, 2015; Brown and Coupland, 2015), 
where success is calculated almost exclusively through masculine ‘hyper-intense fantasies’ (Ekman, 
2013, p.7) of accumulating material and symbolic wealth, coupled with masculine and middle class 
ideas of career progression (Pullen and Rhodes, 2014; Clarke and Knights, 2015), and/ or celebrity 
status (Currid-Halkett, 2010).  As such we remain trapped in this narcissistic (Lasch, 1979; Sennett, 
1977) idée fixee that serves to repress us in our self-disciplined attempts to achieve goals that are often 
just beyond our reach (Costea et al., 2012).  As a means of ameliorating some of these challenges 
arising from some identity research, and by way of suggesting new avenues to explore, we now go off-
road to enter terra nova; a more engaged and embodied approach to theorising identity. 
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Driven back to the Body 
Dominant among organizational scholars is the central interest ‘in subjective identities as construed 
through discourse and other symbolic means’ (Brown, 2015, p.21), with claims that ‘taking languaging 
seriously enables researchers to begin to unravel the complexities of the processes of identity formation 
and construction’, although ‘this is not to imply that “identity” is nothing but talk and text’ (Ybema et 
al. 2009, p.303/304).  Unfortunately, much of the literature that has focused on discourse has failed to 
interrogate the self-defeating preoccupation with identity as a source of security and we have criticized 
what we describe as their myopia and amnesia in neglecting authors (e.g. Becker, Clough, Knights and 
Willmott, Watts) who have refused to see identity as synonymous with commonsense. Equally this 
myopia has led to a neglect of the body or embodied notions of identity.  
That there has been an absence of the body is perhaps understandable given how the linguistic 
turn (Judovitz, 2001) has rendered the symbolic, language and discourse dominant within social 
science generally, and within the identity literature in particular (Kenny et al., 2011). Although 
important to understand the interpersonal as well as the discursive aspects (McInnes and Corlett, 2012, 
p. 28), the literature has tended to neglect the exploration of identity in relation to our embodied 
engagement with others (Gatens, 1996; Braidotti, 2013).  This neglect is evident in three recent journal 
special issues on identity in Organization (Beech, 2008; Watson, 2008), Human Relations (Clarke et 
al., 2009; Costas and Fleming, 2009; Down and Reveley, 2009; Watson, 2009), and The Scandinavian 
Journal of Management where the ‘principal concern is subjectively construed discursive identities’ 
(Coupland and Brown, 2012, p.1), discourse (Clarke et al., 2012; Ybema et al., 2012); conversations 
(McInnes and Corlett, 2012); and narratives (Beech et al., 2012; Mallett and Wapshott, 2012).  
Unfortunately this almost exclusive tendency to logocentricism means that many organizational 
scholars constitute the self in ways that appear to deny, even erase the body, or at the very least present 
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identity as an almost exclusively linguistic phenomenon, concerned only with self-conscious, cognitive 
and disembodied processes.  Consequently, the body and materiality are displaced, resulting in a 
problem of myopia recognized by the editors of this special issue when they invited scholars ‘to look 
beyond ‘talk’ to examine the literature and ‘future direction that studies of embodied performance of 
identity might take’ (Corlett, et al., 2015). Revisiting earlier literature could help us create a future in 
which identity is theorized not only as discursive and symbolic, but also as embodied and material, 
though we are not so much proposing something new as prompting each other to acknowledge its 
importance.  For example, Watts reminds us that ‘we know the world in terms of the body’ (Watts, 
1966, p.100), while according to Spinoza ‘consciousness is by its nature the locus of an illusion’ 
(Deleuze, 1988, p. 19) since it is more a reflection of unconscious desires to sustain life.  We do this 
through our social and material relations that affect, and are affected by us in terms of joyful passion as 
well as sadness, depending on whether the affect is adding to, or subtracting from, our being (Spinoza, 
1677/1883). Identity is often, although need not be, trapped in consciousness to bypass embodied 
being, and the ethics immanent to its encounters with others,  
I can see no sense in restricting the definition of “myself” to the process of conscious 
attention, volition and symbolization.  I must admit my whole body to the definition of 
“myself,’ (Watts, 1970) 
The denial of the body appears stranger when we consider how one of the most important signifiers of 
identity is the body itself (Ainsworth and Hardy, 2004).  Even before exchanging a single syllable with 
another human we explore and assemble a number of aspects of their ‘identity’ through the body, for 
example gender, age, aesthetic appearance, height, colour of skin, approximate weight, style of dress, 
and endless other features. Indeed, in everyday Western life there is an extreme preoccupation with the 
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pursuit of idealized masculine and feminine bodies, undertaken through ‘comparative work’ in relation 
to Others.  Despite this, in most organizational literature, and particularly in relation to identities, the 
body and other aspects of materiality are significant by their absence (Knights, 2015), mainly because 
of the presence (and dominance) afforded to language and discourse (Judovitz, 2001) and by ‘the 
excessively theoretical approach to the body’ in research (Wainwright and Turner, 2006a, p.535).  
However, Watts reminds us of what was known almost 70 years ago, but seems to have been forgotten,  
 
we have been taught to neglect, despise, and violate our bodies, and to put all faith in our 
brains… This corresponds to the split between “I” and “me,” [and] man and nature (Watts, 
1951, p.58) 
 
Inspired partly by posthumanist feminists (e.g. Butler, 1993; Gatens, 1996; Gatens and Lloyd, 1999; 
Grosz, 1994; 2005; Bordo, 2000; Braidotti, 2011), there has been a gathering momentum that seeks to 
remedy the absent bodyiv, but these studies are largely outside of the identity literature (Mol, 2002; 
Fotaki, 2012; Fotaki et al., 2014; Pullen and Rhodes, 2014; Kenny and Fotaki, 2015). Even with a 
myriad of studies about different occupations, attention paid to the physical body of the worker has 
been largely eschewed, with few exceptions (Mol, 2002; Coupland, 2015; Hancock, et al., 2015). Other 
articles may allude to the body or provide a hint of a focus when, for example, Tomkins and Eatough 
talk about ‘the interplay between self, body and story in the way that people make sense of their 
organizational worlds’ (2014, p. 6), but still do not provide an embodied analysis of identity where 
mind and body are inseparable, nor attempt to challenge the conditions and consequences of our 
attachments to identity in the way that we seek to do in this article. This is the case even in literature 
that specifically studies bodies at work, for example, when Leonard writes about identity in relation to 
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doctors and nurses (2003) she limits its focus to discourse, and in Tyler’s (2011) analysis of sex 
workers, she eschews the body in attending to other important issues such as space, sexuality and 
abjection.  
The rising interest in aesthetic labour touches more specifically on the commodification and 
colonisation of the body as corporate capital (Tyler and Abbott, 1998; Wolkowitz, 2006), but still there 
is a need to problematise, rather than just reinforce, the preoccupation with self/body as ‘aspects of 
aesthetic labour may obscure or detract from the affective, embodied and material dimensions of their 
labour’ (Harvey et al. (2014, p.456). Elsewhere, in taking a less myopic look outside of organization 
studies, Leder’s work on the Absent Body (1990) became the impetus for a plethora of studies claiming 
to have restored the body to sociology (e.g. Crossley, 2001; Featherstone and Turner, 1995; Turner, 
1996) and yet these have also been ‘chastised for privileging theorizing, of bracketing out the 
individual, and for ignoring the practical experiences of embodiment’, rather than seeking to 
‘illuminate relationships between the body, self, society and culture’ (Wainwright and Turner, 2006b, 
p.238/240).   
In writing about Organizational Identity, Harquail and Wilcox King acknowledge the 
‘theoretical limitations of the Cartesian assumptions of mind-body dualisms’, and advocate going 
‘beyond the abstractions that an individual can verbalize’ (2010, p.1620).  This paper highlights how 
essentialist, social constructionist and linguistic-discursive identity frameworks all ‘privilege verbal 
articulations and abstract processing and pay little to no overt attention to embodied knowing’ (p.1629).  
However, their view of “embodied cognition” seems to reinforce the very dualisms they seek to avert 
insofar as they create a division, and privilege work done by the brain and knowledge gained via the 
body, as if these can be somehow divorced from one another. However, they do highlight an important 
topic in organizational studies since workers’ occupational histories become inscribed on their bodies 
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‘only then to be regenerated through the embodied work and competence of the body’ (Crossley, 2001, 
p.106; Mol, 2002).  Harquail and Wilcox King (also invite ‘scholars in all traditions of Organizational 
Identity research to bring the full body of the organization member back into consideration’ (2010, 
p.1629/p.1631). 
Although we are sceptical that it was ever there in the first place, we wholeheartedly agree that a 
more embodied approach to theorising identity at work would mitigate some serious, even dangerous, 
implications in relation to our own bodies and the way that we construct the Other, not least because 
when we consider characteristics of the body we confer specific associations/attributes on them; 
stereotypical identities that are potentially racist, sexist, or ageist. Here we are not simply concerned 
with ‘political correctness’, but how constituting the other enforces dualistic tendencies, which tend to 
privilege white over black, masculinity over femininity, or the new/ young over the old/ elderly 
(Knights, 2015).  Departing from a view of relational, processual and dynamic possibilities, this tends 
instead to essentialise and reify whole swathes of people by assigning them fixed attributes and specific 
identities in society so that identities then ‘become hardened or reified’ into what seems like 
“properties” that exist outside of the human realm’ (Kenny et al., 2011, p.130),   
In the act of putting everything at a distance so as to describe and control it, we have 
orphaned ourselves …from our own bodies (Watts,1966, p.105) 
Relatedly, while work in western society has generally been considered as one of the major sources of 
identity, historically it has tended to be heavily gendered and masculine in its design.  To clarify, we 
‘understand gender not as the natural properties of biological men and women, but as the socially 
produced pattern of meanings that distinguish the masculine from the feminine’ (Pullen and Rhodes, 
2008, p.7).  It has also been argued that redemption of the body is dependent on ‘the truth of the 
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masculine principle’ being brought into harmony with ‘the corresponding truth of the feminine 
principle’ (Levin, 1985, p. 58). Whilst challenging the idea of a single principle rather than a 
multiplicity of diverse perceptions and practices surrounding gender difference, we do believe that 
masculine ideals are often predicated on ‘control, conquest, and competitive success’ that seem to 
accompany our instrumental pursuits and  beliefs in ‘self-mastery’ (Knights and Kerfoot, 2004, p. 432) 
so here we begin to see a link between the problem of disembodiment/masculinity and our earlier 
discussions around failing to interrogate identity at work. For self-mastery, or indeed masterly control 
over others (Pullen and Rhodes, 2008) implies a focus on, or narcissist preoccupation with oneself. 
This precludes a commitment to, and respect for, diversity and difference (Diprose, 1994), or an 
exploration of our embodied and ethical engagement with others, as endorsed by posthumanist 
feminists (e.g. Barad, 2007; Braidotti, 2011; Pullen and Rhodes, 2014). 
 
Recently, a special issue in Organization claims that embodiment and affect can become the catalyst 
for, 
a radical politics, which challenges gendered oppression in organizations and which affirms a 
life beyond the suffocating constraints that gender can impose (Pullen et Al., 2017, p.107) 
Without an embodied approach, everything is transformed into an object, moving towards a ‘logical 
control of the world’ (Negri, 2004, p. 4) in which there is every possibility of a ‘destruction of being’.  
This is especially visible in the field of management where personal life, family, and even physical and 
mental health are subordinated to the ‘greater’ goals of conquest, mastery, and competitive material and 
symbolic success. These sacrifices in the name of organizational survival also maintain images of 
masculine managerial selves, pursuing strategies of ‘ordering the world’ around an illusory stable and 
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secure identity (Game, 1990; Clough, 1992) that revolves around an elite, narcissistic and exclusive 
mode of social bonding (Knights and Tullberg, 2012).  
         We see gender as significant in the way that identity is often discussed (or not discussed), 
where women are ‘subsumed by their collective identities as reproductive and sexualized bodies, 
in a manner which does not apply to men’ (Gatrell, 2008, p.14), and that may constrain their 
chances of equality in recruitment, promotion, pay and many other matters. We acknowledge, of 
course, that many organizational scholars have been writing about issues of gender at work for 
many years, albeit usually outside of ‘identity’ research (e.g. Cockburn, 1984; Acker, 1990), yet 
still there is a prevailing myopia whereby bodies are presumed to be neutral or ‘genderless and 
homogenised’ (Linstead and Thomas, 2002, p.15),  
‘Man is the model and it is his body that is taken for the human body’ (Gatens, 1996, p.24).  
Recently, however, there has been a call for writing, and not just the content related to this topic to 
become more embodied, to go beyond linguistic and symbolic explanations to find a way of ‘writing 
from the body that overcomes inequalities’ (Fotaki, 2012, p.1241).  This can be used for the purposes 
of exposing how ‘gendered scripts are written and carved on bodies and psyches and how these have 
implications for the lived experiences of women (and, we will argue, men) in organizations’ (ibid, 
p.1251).  Of course, this is no easy task for as writers we are ‘using words to dispel the illusion of 
language while employing one of the languages that generates them’ (Watts, 1966, p.57), so by 
definition ineffability tends to confound text,   
Since affect is excess, it escapes discursive capture and naming. In other words, it is about an 
aspect of bodily experience that eludes interpretation by language. (Fotaki et al., 2017, p.4)  
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Although currently in its foetal stage, more embodied forms of writing (Pullen, 2006; Fotaki et al. 
2014; Phillips et al. 2014) about identity, including a departure from prescriptive logocentric and 
fantastical accounts of research could, we believe, offer an excellent and rich seam of study to be 
enjoyed in the future by producing engaged and diverse accounts of our lives at work. 
While the treatment of age, ethnicity and sexuality are also highly relevant for any discussion of 
identity (Esser and Benschops, 2009; Rumens and Kerfoot, 2009; Pullen and Thanem, 2010; Riach and 
Cutcher, 2014), a fuller discussion is beyond the scope of this article.  However, we argue that the 
issues of identity and embodiment already discussed are fundamental to providing a more nuanced 
understanding of how persistent inequalities at work (and wider society) construct marginalised Others 
out of difference.  In privileging particular values and ideas relating to this kind of person, or that kind 
of person, this difference can facilitate social exclusion and a lack of care for the Other (Diprose, 1994, 
2002; Ziarek, 2001). This myopic interpretation of what it means to be human ensures that unequal 
power relationships remain intact, and unresolved; an elevation of individualistic, competitive material 
and symbolic success over ethical and embodied engagement (Pullen and Rhodes, 2014).   
As we have intimated, by embracing Spinoza’s radical and affirmative sense of being, a challenge 
can be mobilized, for his political thought traverses the theory of natural right in order to deny its two 
fundamental principles: individualism and the contract (Negri, 2004 p.24). As such we might refuse the 
ontological and political separations between subjects and objects and between individuals and society, 
which have resulted in individualizing strategies that serve to isolate subjects and fragment 
communities (ibid.).  This challenge embraces a posthumanist feminist ethics that is concerned to care 
for and engage with the lived experience of the other, however different (Diprose, 1994; 2002; Ziarek, 
2001; Pullen and Rhodes, 2014). One of our central arguments has been that the preoccupation with 
identity renders this ethics of engagement with difference problematic, since identity is often threatened 
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by ‘the mere presence of the other’ (Ziarek, 2001, p. 74), but this could be otherwise, and partly for this 
reason, it is necessary to ground ‘the ethical (and the ethico-political in particular) in bodies, in the 
materiality of desire’ (Negri, 2013, p.17).  
Summary and Conclusion 
In our review of the MOS literature, we have found that identity is often not problematized because of 
its tendency to be taken for granted as a self-contained given (e.g. Beech et al., 2012; Ybema et al., 
2009; Gill, 2015; Hoyer and Steyaert, 2015). Furthermore, even when explored, individuals’ 
preoccupation with, or attachment to, identity is rarely challenged. Partly this may be because the 
attachment that we all have to our own identities stops us from treating it as anything other than 
normal, much like the air we breathe. It is also the case that at times, academics tend to treat identity in 
the same way as do lay persons, even though for the former it constitutes a topic for academic study 
while for the latter it ordinarily represents a resource in managing everyday life.  Of course, academics 
are not only analysts, and in practice may also behave in a commonsense way with respect to identity, 
thus treating it unproblematically and sometimes instrumentally as a way of seeking to overcome 
insecurities (Knights and Clarke, 2014). However, when some authors comment on the fragility or 
precariousness of identity whereby it ‘appears to be either a momentary achievement or a resilient 
fiction’ (Ybema et al., 2009, p.301), they often neglect to theorize why this might be the case.  
In addition, where discourses on identity are embedded in subject (agency) - object (society) 
ontologies that give precedence either to voluntarist or determinist epistemologies, and a politics in 
which one or other side of binary relations is privileged hierarchically (Knights, 2015), neither the 
desire for a secure self or its often-contradictory outcomes tend to be questioned.  Moreover, these 
ontological, epistemological and political leanings invariably result in cognitive or discursive accounts 
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in which the body is neglected or displaced, such that identity is treated in a wholly disembodied 
manner.  
We understand that in criticizing the omissions and flaws evident in the work of others, we are 
likely to have committed similar errors to those we criticize. Although this may be lamentable, 
Derridean (1995) notions of responsibility indicate that it is impossible for it to be otherwise, since 
when we talk of one thing we must necessarily neglect another, so that we can never wholly justify any 
choices or decisions.  It has not been our intention to provide an exhaustive review of the identity 
literature, for such an aspiration would be equally as self-defeating as other (masculine inspired) 
totalizing desires, narratives or projects. However, in this necessarily selective presentation of a range 
of texts, it has been our aim to provoke scholars into remembering what has gone before, to move 
beyond treating identity as a taken for granted resource towards a view that it is a conceptually 
complicated yet embodied set of ideas that always require interrogation.  If, in the future, we can peer 
beyond the myopic confines of using identity as a novel panacea (since it is neither new, or a cure-all), 
then we might begin to address these problems of ‘underspecification’ that have prevented analyses of 
identity from realising their potential.  We believe that our forgetfulness and shortsightedness is one of 
the reasons for this ‘lack’, as well as a tendency for analysis to be disembodied and hence dualistic, 
whereby minds and cognitions perpetually deride or displace our bodies.  This reflects the dominant 
masculine norms in discourse and deflects the kind of interrogation of identity that we have sought to 
invoke here. Consequently, we have looked backwards historically and sideways to other disciplines 
for insights that can assist us in moving more positively towards the generation of insights that could 
guide future research on identities. 
Relatedly, it is important to recognize that the ‘constitution of identity is always an act of 
power’ (Laclau, 1990, p.33) because identity is predicated on a hierarchically defined order, whereby 
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the ‘marked’ term ‘woman’, ‘black’ or ‘old’ is subordinated to the unmarked term ‘man’, ‘white’ or 
‘young’, and thus they are often embedded in a ‘violent hierarchy between the two resultant poles’ 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 33).  Embodied thinking and practice alone may not reverse this since co-optation is 
always available to power, and a major reason why Foucault resisted talking too much about resistance 
(Sheridan, 1980). However, as is often the case in social movements (Graeber, 2009), we can avoid this 
co-optation of resistance by becoming less instrumental and adversarial in our politics, simply being 
embodied and engaged, not as a means-to- an-end, but as an end in itself (Springer, 2016). This kind of 
engagement coincides with what has recently been described as the ‘affective turn’ (Clough, 2008; 
2010; Wetherell, 2015) where, drawing on the 17th century philosopher Spinoza, attention is given to 
the virtual forces that lie behind action insofar as affectivity is prior to the individualized subject, yet 
might connect ‘the striving of the human being to maintain its mode of identity with the embodied 
basis of (human) life’ (Hansen, 2004, p. 250 quoted in Clough, 2008, p. 8).  While affect may provide a 
link between the body and the identity of the subject as constituted through power (Foucault, 1982), it 
also resonates with our concerns to diminish both the theoretical and everyday preoccupation with the 
attachment to identity.   
We have argued that it should be impossible to divorce any discussion of identity from the body 
and discursive practices of diversity, even though there has been insufficient space to do this 
comprehensively in a review article; however, we can outline what might be a starting framework for 
such a future enterprise, which also serves to summarise our contribution.  A first step we have 
attempted is to challenge the tendency to take identity for granted rather than interrogate it, because this 
enables us to engage with the ephemeral and impermanent conditions and consequences of its 
(re)production. Historically, as we have seen, identity or the concern for social recognition has been 
associated with freedom and wellbeing and idealized (Hegel, 1807) as an ideology in contemporary 
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Western society (Cederström and Spicer, 2015). Yet we see freedom and wellbeing as equally 
precarious and transitory as identity, only ever to be glimpsed in inexpressible, ineffable, brief 
moments. There are, of course, many obstacles in the way of engaging with this impermanence, not 
least of which are entrenched attachments to identities, whether they be those of work and occupation, 
gender, age, race, sexuality, and ethnicity or the nation state. 
A second step that we have sought to explore is the way that MOS scholars often produce quite 
individualistic and disembodied analyses, sometimes drawing specifically on discourses and practices 
of masculinity. Here the attachment to humanistic notions invariably means seeking to construct the 
world as orderly, stable and predictable so as to attain the image of a secure masculine self (Clough, 
1992). This is because we treat identity as a resource for securing a future where humans desire and 
aspire to attaining a position ‘higher, better, or nobler than the one they currently occupy’ 
(Thornborrow and Brown, 2009, p.356), an ideal that is futile since even if desirable, it is a future that 
can never be realised.  Why? Because it is self-defeating insofar as it is ‘a constantly retreating 
phantom, and the faster you chase it, the faster it runs ahead’ (Watts, 1951, p.56).  As such, in writing 
about both identity and identity work we must interrogate the underlying assumptions rather than 
reproducing them, for as Ekman advises ‘the best defence against this kind of domination’ is in 
attempting ‘to establish an ethical struggle against the ideological logic of replacing one fantasy with 
another’ (2013, p.19), a process of continually replacing (‘failed’) projects with new ones, with never 
ending optimism that this will be ‘the one’ to secure our present and future sense of self. 
In identity studies, we also believe that constructing the individual as somehow divorced from 
his/her own body is problematic for developing knowledge, because it pretends the absence of what 
cannot be denied – ageing, decay and finitude (Becker, 1973).  Similarly, we feel that constantly 
separating the individual from the social, with talk of ‘internal’ worlds versus ‘external’ worlds, and 
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claims that identity provides a bridging mechanism between the two (e.g. Ybema et al., 2009) is 
equally problematic, for how can the individual be anything other than social?  By reinforcing this 
artificial separation between the two, it is the case that we (albeit unconsciously) legitimise the 
individual in privileging his/herself over society in ways that are seemingly desirable but impossible 
and potentially dangerous. What we have been concerned to accomplish in this article is a revival of 
studies that are far from their sell-by date, to challenge the way that everyday commonsense reflects 
and reinforces subjective attachments to identity as a means of seeking to fulfil the desire for security 
and stability. Moreover, it could be that our attachments to identity preclude us from a ceaseless self-
questioning that challenges conventional orthodoxies including those concerning identity (Knights, 
2015). For such conceptions sustain false separations between mind and body, individual and society, 
self and other, as well as human and non-human. Instead we have argued for a sense of identity as 
embodied, such that we are no longer wholly dependent on the social approval of others to confirm the 
sense of who we are, because being in the world is its own verisimilitude.   
Lastly, in future studies of identity at work we exhort scholars to put aside their amnesiac and 
myopic tendencies regarding earlier theoretical contributions by retracing and recollecting the 
genealogical footprint.  For example, when managerialist/functionalist perspectives talk about working 
on our identities to ‘enhance’ our careers, which at face value seem plausible and even compelling, our 
scepticism should be alerted to problematise this narrow and myopic preoccupation with ourselves.  
For such ideals only lead to compulsive behaviour that encourages us to find meaning in our own 
subjection, fixating on ‘securing the self both materially and symbolically’ (Clarke and Knights, 2015, 
p.1879). As we have shown, these uncritical interpretations of identity are common, partly as a result of 
their ahistorical treatment, but our collective responsibility in recognising them is all the more salient 
because identity is ‘connected to nearly every topic in organization and management studies’ (Brown, 
35 | P a g e  
 
2015, p.24).  This is especially the case for ‘identity work’, claiming to be the ‘dominant metaphor’ in 
organization studies (Brown, 2015, p.25), but one that has failed to interrogate its own limitations as ‘a 
story telling exercise’ (Clegg et al., 2007, p.508), or thinly veiled conscious/unconscious narcissism 
(Pullen and Rhodes, 2008).  We believe there are implications when authors neglect to theorise identity 
along the road, and so we end our travels with an invitation to open up new avenues for discussion, by 
remembering what has been forgotten.  In short, by constantly working on our identities in this way or 
that way, through this means or that means, achieving the security we earnestly desire remains a futile 
project, and one potentially keeping us on the road to nowhere, for the more we seek to secure 
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iWe thank the special issue guest editor Peter McInnes for encouraging us to develop this in the R&R.  
ii Retrograde amnesia is where pre-existing memories are lost to conscious recollection.  This does of course 
assume that this knowledge was already there at some point, which in this case we can never know. This has led 
to some debate between the authors as to whether the issue is forgetting, ignoring or never having read these 
earlier literatures. 
iii  This has its parallel in physics where Heisenberg understood electrons only to exist when in interaction with 
other objects in an atomic field (Rovelli, 2014: 15).  
iv This has been described as an ‘absent presence’ (Leder, 2000:7) because while the body is absent from 
discourses, it cannot be denied in the practices to which these refer.  
